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Abstract
In this paper we investigate audit pricing for financial institutions. We modify the
standard audit fee model for industrial companies by incorporating measures of risk
and complexity that are either unique to or more relevant for banks, and that are used
by bank regulatory agencies. For a sample of 277 financial institutions in fiscal 2000, we
find that audit fees are higher for banks having more transactions accounts, fewer
securities as a percentage of total assets, lower levels of efficiency, and higher degrees of
credit risk. Higher fees also obtain for savings institutions, for banks that are more
involved in acquisition activity, and for institutions that are required by regulatory
agencies to maintain higher levels of risk-adjusted capital. Our model reveals that the
complexities and risks deemed most important by regulatory agencies are also those that
tend to be priced by audit firms. The importance of the audit process for banks is likely
to intensify in the future as regulatory changes increase the importance of market dis-
cipline in controlling bank risk-taking.
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1. Introduction
Banking organizations comprise over 20% of the total public equity market
capitalization in the United States. Moreover, banks are vital to the operation
of our domestic economy in their role as depository institutions and lenders to
both corporations and individuals. Despite the economic importance of the
banking industry, however, accounting researchers have done little to investi-
gate the various relationships that exist between banks and their auditors. We
examine one such relationship––that of audit pricing––by using extensive
industry-specific disclosures to determine which client-specific characteristics
are the primary drivers of bank audit fees.
Our setting is relevant for a number of reasons. First, in the spirit of Beaver
(1996), the setting allows us to extend the general audit fee model into a very
rich institutional context. Specifically, most audit and assurance fee studies
(e.g., Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Defond et al., 2000; Copley and Douthett,
2002) exclude financial institutions because banks are ‘‘different.’’ That is, al-
though the same general theoretical constructs (size, risk, and complexity)
should drive fees for all types of organizations, a number of the empirical
proxies typically included in fee models––e.g., financial leverage, current or
quick ratio, inventory and receivables as a percentage of total assets––are not
meaningful for banks. The fee model developed in this paper incorporates
numerous measures that are unique to the banking industry, thereby providing
a framework within which bank audit pricing can be examined empirically.
An investigation of the relationship between bank regulatory bodies and
audit firms is also important due to the high levels of litigation risk in this
industry. 1 Unlike industrial companies, the litigation risks associated with
bank audits stem from actions brought by both shareholders and the federal
government. For example, in November of 1992 Ernst and Young was re-
quired to pay the US government $400 million––almost ten times larger than
the largest previous settlement for professional firms––to settle claims related
to thrift failures. According to counsel for the Office of Thrift Supervision, this
ruling and others like it have effectively established ‘‘. . .a standard for now and
the future to govern the audit of depository institutions’’ (Rosenblatt, 1992).
Because bank auditors are subject to such extensive regulatory scrutiny, we
believe that bank audit fees are likely to be tied to regulatory risks. If such ties
serve to moderate the litigation risks associated with bank audits, our paper
could be useful to accounting firms as they evaluate their litigation exposure in
this high-risk industry.
1 Palmrose (1988) shows that banks and savings and loans were responsible for more audit
litigation cases than any other three-digit SIC code between 1960 and 1985.
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Our analysis is also important to parties other than auditors. Financial
institutions are primarily responsible to their respective regulatory authorities.
Regulatory agencies, in turn, rely heavily on the work of external auditors as
they make their evaluations of banks financial condition. It is therefore in the
interests of many different parties that bank audits emphasize factors that are
important to regulators. Stated differently, an audit function that fails to
adequately address important regulatory considerations would expose both
bank shareholders and the public at large (as users of the banking system) to
unnecessary risks. By examining the relationship between fees charged by audit
firms and the primary regulatory risks that exist for banks, our paper speaks to
this issue directly.
Finally, and more generally, our study is relevant because auditors are
vitally important to the banking system. For example, under the Basel Com-
mittee for Banking Supervision New Basel Capital Accord, the assessment
of capital adequacy depends partially on the market discipline that stems
from increased transparency of a banks financial condition. The audit func-
tion plays an integral role in providing this transparency. Furthermore,
changes in the bank audit system that have occurred since the savings and
loan crisis of the 1980s have raised questions about whether the private
audit will eventually become a substitute for the public (i.e., governmental)
audit. Indeed, in a number of countries––Canada, Denmark, New Zealand,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom––the role of private auditors has
expanded substantially, even to the point of replacing public audits. Given
this potentiality, the increased role of market discipline as mandated by
Basel, and the need for reliable information at the base of the regulatory
structure, it is important that we develop an understanding of the effectiveness
and efficiency of the bank audit process. Our initial analysis of the determi-
nants of bank audit fees may serve as a springboard for future research in this
area.
Our tests are based on a sample of 277 banks in fiscal 2000. For these banks,
our results show that audit fees are strongly related to many of the risk factors
deemed important by federal regulatory agencies. We find that audit fees are
higher for banks having more transaction accounts and higher degrees of credit
risk and capital risk. Higher fees also obtain for institutions that are less effi-
cient operationally and that are more heavily involved in acquisition activity,
while banks with more transparent asset portfolios benefit from fee discounts.
Finally, savings institutions are charged a significant premium relative to other
banks. We contend that this premium likely is attributable to diseconomies of
scale in the thrift audit market as well as to the prevalence of complex mort-
gage-related hedging strategies among these types of institutions. It is also
possible, however, that premiums for S&Ls are simply holdovers from the
extensive litigation associated with these organizations during the savings and
loan crisis of the 1980s.
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We also examine the relationship between bank audit fees and auditor
industry specialization. Similar to Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) investigation of
industrial firms, we find that an economy of scale-based fee discount does
obtain in the bank audit market. However, unlike industrial firm auditors, the
leading bank auditors appear to be unable to use their market dominance to
recapture this fee discount. One possible explanation for this finding is that
dominant bank auditors price their audits more competitively than they per-
haps could in order to gain access to clients with greater (and higher margin)
non-audit service needs. Our analysis of the relationship between non-audit
fees and audit fees for the top two bank audit firms supports this notion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections
we provide background information on bank risks and develop our test vari-
ables. In Section 4 we describe our sample and in Section 5 we present our data
and empirical results. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2. Institutional background
Following the banking and thrift crisis of the 1980s, Congress mandated
that depository institutions have an external audit performed annually by a
public accounting firm. The requirement that both public and private firms in
an industry have an external audit is unique to depository institutions and
imposes a financial burden that is not felt by non-bank competitors. The
external audit adds cost and complexity to the extensive audit requirements
that are already in place for depository institutions. Specifically, in addition to
the internal audit requirements that exist in this industry, the external audit
requirements supplement yet another audit by examiners from the various
regulatory authorities––the Office of the Controller of the Currency (OCC), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Reserve
System (FRS) for commercial banks, and the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) for thrifts.
Because managers of banks and thrifts ultimately are answerable to their
primary regulatory authority, it seems reasonable to suggest that the audit
function should be driven by variables and ratios that these regulators consider
important. Indeed, Congress has given regulators the power to close banks and
thrifts if their financial condition is unsatisfactory, even if they are solvent.
Moreover, the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 established a risk-based de-
posit insurance system in which the cost of deposit insurance to the individual
bank or thrift is based on evaluations of risk––evaluations which make
extensive use of the work of external auditors. In summary, banks are subject
to significant regulatory pressures and regulatory agencies rely heavily on
auditors in making their evaluations of financial condition. The combination of
these two factors leads us to believe that public accounting firms will (and
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should) focus their audits on the factors deemed important by regulatory
agencies.
The bank risk and complexity proxies we present in this paper are based
primarily on the models of the FDIC and the FRS. While the agencies differ
somewhat in the exact measures they emphasize, substantial commonalities
exist. The FRS adopted the Uniform Bank Surveillance System in the mid-
1980s in order to track the financial performance of banks. The system was
structured around financial ratios that measured the capital adequacy of the
bank as well as its earnings, liquidity, and loan quality. During the same
period, the FDIC developed the CAEL (Capital, Asset quality, Earnings, and
Liquidity) Surveillance System. 2 More recently, the FRS has developed the
Financial Institutions Monitoring System (FIMS) to provide information on
the financial condition of banks and thrifts. 3 The primary focus of the FIMS
System is on asset quality, but the model also includes capital adequacy,
earnings, and investment security ratios as well as asset growth rates.
Based upon the similarity of the variables in these different regulatory models,
we focus our fee model on the following dimensions of bank risks: liquidity risk,
operating risk, credit risk, capital or solvency risk, and market risk. Liquidity
risk relates to the possibility that the bank cannot meet its obligations for cash
through the clearing system or from its depositors. Operating risk refers to the
possibility of high operating costs depleting the capital account of the bank.
Banks with high operating risk will find it difficult or impossible to earn
acceptable profit without taking unacceptable risk. Credit risk primarily involves
the quality of the banks assets and the probabilities of default in its loan port-
folio, though credit risk may also exist in the securities portfolio. Capital risk
refers to the potential that shrinkage in the value of assets will deplete the banks
equity account. Finally, market risk involves the potential for negative impact on
the banks financial viability from adverse movements in interest rates. We de-
velop our empirical proxies for these measures below.
3. Regulatory risks and their association with audit fees
3.1. Overview
Extant theory suggests that audit fees should be a function of the size of the
client, the risk of the client, and the complexity of the clients operations. It is
2 The CAEL System is a variant of the CAMEL (Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings,
and Liquidity) rating that is used internally by bank examiners. A sixth acronym––S––was added to
CAMEL in 1997, representing Sensitivity to market risk. See Lopez (1999) for a discussion of the
evolution of the CAMEL rating system.
3 See Cole et al. (1995) for details.
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important to note, however, that what are termed ‘‘bank regulatory risks’’ are
likely to possess elements of both client risk and client complexity. For
example, a bank could be viewed as ‘‘risky’’ because it has complex contracts
with high-risk borrowers. In these and other cases it would be extremely dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to tease out the audit fee effect attributable to ‘‘client
complexity’’ and the audit fee effect attributable to ‘‘client risk.’’ As a result,
while we frame our empirical proxies in terms of their regulatory constructs
(i.e., risks), their influence on audit fees is likely to stem from both factors (i.e.,
risk and complexity).
3.2. Liquidity risk
Our two primary proxies for bank liquidity risk involve transactions ac-
counts and investment securities. Transactions accounts normally include non-
interest-earning demand deposit accounts (DDAs), interest-bearing checking
accounts in the form of negotiable order of withdrawal accounts (NOWs), and
automatic transfer from savings (ATS) accounts. Money market deposit ac-
counts (MMDAs) are also often included as transactions accounts, though the
number of transactions is limited in these accounts. Demand deposit accounts
are held by individuals, corporations and governmental entities. However,
most DDAs are held by corporations because they are prohibited from holding
interest-bearing NOW accounts.
Transactions accounts arise from the basic banking function of providing a
means of payment to consumers and businesses. Banks with large numbers of
transactions accounts necessarily have much more complex activities that are
costly to perform and to monitor. Moreover, large numbers of transactions
accounts are usually associated with a significant number of ATM machines
and a large inventory of currency and coin, which are also costly to maintain
and monitor. The Federal Reserves functional cost analysis reported in 1999
that the direct cost of providing transactions accounts was 3.11% per year. In
contrast, the direct (non-interest) cost of time deposits was only 0.42%,
reflecting their much greater simplicity in processing and monitoring. Banks
with a higher proportion of transactions accounts have higher liquidity risk
and greater operational complexity. Therefore, these banks should have higher
audit fees.
With respect to investment securities, most bank portfolios are comprised of
relatively short-term, liquid instruments having reasonably stable, verifiable
values. For example, corporate and foreign debt securities have made up less
than 3% of the total securities portfolio of commercial banks in recent years.
Fraser et al. (2001) report that about 25% of securities held by commercial
banks have maturities of less than one year, while almost 40% have maturities
between one and five years. Because liquidity risk is decreasing in the pro-
portion of total assets held as securities, banks holding more securities should
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have lower audit fees. Fees may also be negatively related to investment
securities because the relative transparency of the asset portfolio should make
the associated audit work less complicated.
3.3. Operating risk
A commonly used measure of operating risk for banking organizations is the
efficiency ratio––defined as the ratio of total operating expense to total revenue
(net interest income plus non-interest income). The higher the efficiency ratio
(i.e., the lower the efficiency for the bank), the more difficult it is for the bank to
earn a profit and thus to bolster its capital account. High efficiency ratios stem
from large non-interest expenses relative to revenue generation. Typically, large
non-interest expenses––principally for personnel, branches, and data process-
ing––are associated with large volumes of transactions accounts and with a
geographically diverse branch system. As such, the efficiency ratio could also be
viewed as a proxy for the complexity of bank operations. We anticipate that less
efficient banks should have higher audit fees, both because transaction volume
and geographic dispersion should complicate the audit function and because
fees should be increasing in a banks operating risk.
3.4. Credit risk
Credit risk is the principal risk faced by most banking organizations. Our
measures of bank credit risk relate to banks loan portfolio composition and to
loan quality. Commercial loans typically involve commercial and industrial
loans, loans to depository institutions, acceptances issued by other banks, and
obligations (other than securities) of states and political subdivisions. We also
include commercial mortgage and agricultural loans in our definition of
commercial loans. These loans are made for short-term working capital pur-
poses such as to finance receivables and inventory, and for expansion of plant
and equipment. Many commercial loans are extended under open lines of
credit whereby the timing and the amount of the loans are determined by the
actions of the borrower.
Commercial loans are complex transactions and frequently involve signifi-
cant collateralization. Furthermore, the audit and evaluation of a commercial
loan portfolio is difficult because the portfolio lacks transparency, thereby
increasing measuring and monitoring costs. Moreover, commercial loans are
increasingly syndicated. 4 For the originator and creator of the syndicate,
4 Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) report that over $1 trillion of commercial loans were syndicated
in 1997. Banks tend to syndicate larger loans from higher quality borrowers and keep smaller loans
from lower quality borrowers on their own balance sheets.
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issues often arise as to the potential liabilities of the originator for loans sold
into the syndicate. For buyers of syndicated loans, generally smaller banks, the
portfolio is appreciably more difficult to evaluate because the buying bank did
not perform the primary credit evaluation for the loan. Because banks with
high concentrations of commercial loans are likely to have greater credit risk
and less loan portfolio transparency, we expect to find a positive relationship
between audit fees and the proportion of commercial loans in an institutions
total loan portfolio. This relationship is likely to be particularly important for
banks having a large number of non-performing loans and/or inadequate loan
loss reserves.
In recent years, losses on commercial and industrial loans have exceeded
those on other types of bank loans with the exception of loans to individuals
(especially credit card loans). 5 However, the credit risk associated with higher
loss ratios on loans to individuals is mitigated by the very high interest rates
on these loans and by their small size. Stated differently, the small size of most
individual loans makes their net loss ratios as a group both small and highly
predictable. In contrast, commercial loans tend to be large––in many cases,
large enough that a few defaults could threaten the viability of the lending
bank. Auditors associated with such banks could be exposed to significantly
higher levels of litigation risk, given that one of their principal audit
responsibilities is to verify the adequacy of the loan loss reserve account. In
fact, failure to audit loan loss allowances in accordance with GAAS was noted
as a key factor both in the Ernst and Young $400 million 1992 ruling men-
tioned previously and in a $187 million 1994 ruling against KPMG Peat
Marwick.
Our final measure of credit risk involves residential mortgage loans. Resi-
dential mortgage loans generally involve bank loans secured by 1–4 family
residences. The loans typically have very low default rates and, even in default,
the loss to the bank lender is usually small. However, the growth of securiti-
zation––by which most residential mortgage loans are packaged as securities
and sold to outside investors––has had a substantial effect on the risk and
complexity of these loans. Loan securitization does reduce the lenders credit
risk; however, banks often engage in substantial hedging strategies to mitigate
the interest rate risk during the time that these loans are held prior to their
packaging into portfolios. The relative lack of transparency in these hedging
strategies suggests that audit effort (and hence, audit fees) should be an
increasing function of the proportion of residential mortgage loans in a given
institutions portfolio. Stated differently, while credit risks certainly exist in a
residential mortgage loan portfolio, the complexity associated with auditing
5 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Performance. Fourth Quarter,
2000.
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the associated hedging strategies may be the primary incremental determinant
of audit fees.
3.5. Capital risk
Our main proxy for capital risk is the total risk-adjusted capital ratio, de-
fined as the total amount of bank regulatory capital (i.e., common equity,
perpetual preferred stock, loan loss reserves, and some types of subordinated
debt) divided by risk-weighted assets. Banks are required to maintain a mini-
mum risk-adjusted capital ratio of 8%. Audit fees should be increasing in the
clients level of capital risk; however, the relationship between audit fees and
the risk-adjusted capital ratio could conceivably be positive or negative.
Practically speaking, riskier banks are often required by regulators to maintain
larger regulatory capital cushions. In this instance a positive relationship would
be expected between the risk-adjusted capital ratio and audit fees. However it is
also reasonable to think that banks are riskier, by definition, when they have
lower levels of risk-adjusted capital. As a result, although we anticipate that
regulators are relatively proactive with respect to this particular measure, we
do realize that a negative relationship between risk-adjusted capital and audit
fees may exist.
We also include intangible assets as a proxy for capital risk, though the link
is less direct than with the risk-adjusted capital ratio. Bank intangibles typically
represent goodwill resulting from mergers and acquisitions. Banks with large
amounts of intangible assets are likely to be more complex organizations
and may also be viewed as having relatively aggressive, risk-taking manage-
ment (due to their acquisition activities). Because goodwill is deducted in
the calculation of regulatory capital, banks that are aggressive in their risk-
taking through acquisitions may impair their capital account. In sum, intan-
gibles combine aspects of complexity and capital risk; as a result, we expect
that banks with high relative levels of intangible assets will have higher audit
fees.
3.6. Market risk
A sixth measure of bank financial condition was added to the CAMEL
rating system in 1997. This measure––S, for ‘‘Sensitivity’’ (resulting in CAM-
ELS)––is designed to determine the extent to which the profitability of the
bank and the value of its assets and liabilities are sensitive to changing market
conditions. Because most of the assets and liabilities of banking organizations
are fixed-rate debt instruments, the regulatory focus for this measure typically
is interest rate risk. We measure interest rate risk as interest-sensitive assets
minus interest-sensitive liabilities. A value of zero would indicate that the bank
is perfectly matched and should experience little change in profit or asset
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valuation due to interest rate changes. A positive (negative) value is indicative
of an asset- (liability-) sensitive position, whereby a banks value should in-
crease with increasing (decreasing) interest rates. Thus, the relationship be-
tween fees and interest rate sensitivity likely will depend on a banks exposure
(asset- versus liability-sensitive) at a given point in time.
4. Data and summary statistics
Our sample consists of 277 banking organizations that reported audit fees in
their 2000 fiscal year proxy statements. These organizations, which represent
the banking subset of a hand-collected database of audit fees for approximately
5000 firms in fiscal 2000, include commercial banks and their holding com-
panies as well as savings institutions and their holding companies. Due to the
growing similarity among these institutions and for ease of discussion, we refer
to all of the organizations in the sample as ‘‘banks.’’
Data for our sample of banks were collected from Sheshunoff Information
Services Bank Source database. Selected summary measures are presented in
Table 1. Because we have a large number of variables, we restrict our discus-
sion in the text to those that we believe are most important in establishing
general firm characteristics and in making comparisons to industry-wide
measures. Column 1 of Table 1 describes the summary measure and Column 2
presents the name of the associated regression variable. Our multivariate model
uses logarithmic transformations of both audit fees and total assets; however,
for ease of interpretation the untransformed values are presented in Table 1.
Furthermore, due to the presence of a few very large organizations (e.g., Bank
of America, Wells Fargo, and Bank One reported total assets at year-end 2000
of more than $250 billion) our emphasis is on median values.
Table 1 (Panel A) shows that firms in our sample range in market capital-
ization from roughly $7 million (First Southern Bancshares) to over $95 billion
(Wells Fargo), with a median value of $132 million. Total assets have a median
value of approximately $1.2 billion and median year-end deposits are $945
million. The median audit fee for the banks in our sample is $124,000, com-
prising roughly 2% of the absolute value of net income. Similar to the other
measures, the distribution of net income across our sample firms is wide,
ranging from a loss of over $500 million to a profit of over $7.5 billion. Our
measure of general equity risk, the standard deviation of stock returns for one
year preceding the end of the 2000 fiscal year, is commonly used in the
assurance fee literature. The standard deviation of returns for our sample is
much lower (median of 2.7%) than that typically documented in studies of IPO
firms. This result is not surprising, of course, because established firms, par-
ticularly banks, are likely to have lower levels of equity risk than firms that
have recently entered the public equity markets.
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The mean and median values for the efficiency ratio––our proxy for bank
operating risk––are both approximately 60%, suggesting that for the banks in
our sample, roughly 60 cents of every dollar of revenue goes to pay operating
expenses. The FDICs Quarterly Banking Profile reported that all banks
averaged an efficiency ratio of 58.4% in 2000, so our sample banks appear to be
comparable to the industry as a whole. Table 1 (Panel A) also provides
Table 1
Selected summary data for 277 bank holding companies reporting audit fees for fiscal 2000
Variable Regression
Variable
Mean Median Min Max
Panel A: Financial information
Audit fee ($ mil) LOGFEE 0.306 0.124 0.022 13.175
Market value of equity
($ mil)
– 2013 132 7 95,181
Total assets ($ mil) LOGASS 9537 1204 150 642,191
Total deposits ($ mil) – 6132 945 82 364,244
Net income ($ mil) – 109 11 )511 7517
Std. Dev. of returns (1 year) STDRET 0.028 0.027 0.008 0.086
Transaction accounts/total
deposits
TRANSACCT 0.200 0.199 0.006 0.531
Securities/total assets SECURITIES 0.229 0.217 0.097 0.580
Efficiency ratio EFFICIENCY 0.622 0.608 0.306 2.067
Commercial loans/gross
loans
COMMLOAN 0.434 0.417 0.001 0.949
Non-performing loans/gross
loans
NONPER-
FORM
0.008 0.006 0.000 0.066
Net charge-offs/loan loss
reserve
CHGOFF 0.181 0.139 )0.492 1.895
Mortgage loans/gross loans MTGLOAN 0.323 0.305 0.000 0.998
Risk-adjusted capital ratio CAPRATIO 0.136 0.125 0.081 0.540
Intangible assets/total assets INTANG 0.009 0.004 0.000 0.071
(rate sens. assets rate-sens.
Liabs)
SENSITIVE 0.060 0.040 )0.469 0.696
Audit firm # Audits Median
audit fee
($ mil)
Median
client
assets
($ mil)
Median
client
MVE
($ mil)
Panel B: Auditor information
KPMG Peat Marwick 69 (25%) 0.124 1,250 141
Ernst & Young 39 (14%) 0.250 4,611 795
Arthur Andersen 38 (14%) 0.173 1,405 174
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 28 (10%) 0.188 2,785 441
Deloitte & Touche 25 (9%) 0.138 1,021 183
Crowe & Chizek 19 (7%) 0.077 562 58
Grant Thornton 9 (3%) 0.081 630 106
All others 50 (18%) 0.073 449 45
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information on loan portfolio composition and credit risk. Over 40% of our
banks loans are commercial loans and over 30% are mortgage loans. However,
both of these measures range from roughly zero to almost 100%, indicating
that distinct areas of loan specialization exist for different financial institutions.
For example, roughly 41% (25%) of the loans made by the 38 thrifts in our
sample are mortgage (commercial) loans, relative to only 26% (43%) for the
239 other banking organizations. Across all of our sample observations less
than one percent of loans, on average, are classified as non-performing. This
is a relatively low number by historical standards.
The remaining measures in Panel A are proxies for capital risk or market
risk. For our 277 banks the median risk-adjusted capital ratio is 12.5%. For
comparison purposes, the risk-adjusted capital ratio for all banks as of
December 31, 2000, was 12.13%. The FDICs 2000 Quarterly Banking Profile
reported that for banks with over $10 billion in assets the ratio was 11.48%,
and for smaller banks (assets of less than $100 million) the ratio was 17.44%.
Assuming size is negatively correlated with risk, these summary figures sug-
gest that higher levels of risk-adjusted capital could be indicative of pres-
sures placed on smaller banking organizations by governmental regulatory
agencies.
In Table 1 (Panel B) we break down selected data items by audit firm. Panel
B reveals that KPMG has the highest audit market share (25%) in our sample,
when market share is defined in terms of the number of institutions audited.
However, their clients median market capitalization is smaller than that of the
other Big 5 firms and they have the lowest median audit fee as well. As a point
of contrast, Ernst and Young audited 30 fewer banks but their gross audit fees
of $21,443,250 were significantly higher than the $17,085,131 earned by
KPMG. It is also interesting to note that 28% of the banks in our sample were
audited by non-Big 5 accounting firms. While early studies involving public US
companies reported comparable rates, recent work has documented non-Big 5
market share levels of only 5% to 15%. Because banks are subject to high levels
of litigation risk, our findings with respect to audit market share are consistent
with the contention of Simunic and Stein (1996) that increased litigation risk is
likely to result in a shift from larger to smaller audit firms.
5. Fee model and results
5.1. Bank audit fee model
To date, the only fee analysis directly related to banks is by Stein et al.
(1994), who investigate the determinants of fees and labor hours for 108
financial services companies. Stein et al. (1994) use survey data from 1989 to
show that fees for financial institutions are related to size and operational
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and reporting complexity (as defined by the auditor), as well as to the
auditors assessment of the clients assistance and internal control systems.
While Stein et al.s (1994) work is a vital first step in extending the audit fee
literature to the US banking industry, it is difficult to compare to recent fee
studies both because the survey data come from a single public accounting
firm and because its focus on proprietary, auditor-reported measures makes it
difficult to ascertain which financial characteristics drive bank audit fees. 6
Our audit fee model builds from specifications commonly used in the audit
and assurance fee literature. We regress audit fees on measures of firm size,
complexity and risk while controlling for industry (explicitly, given that our
sample is comprised entirely of banks), time (because the sample is based on
a single year of audit fees) and auditor quality. The form of the model is as
follows:
LOGFEEj ¼ c0þ c1LOGASSjþ c2BIG5jþ c3LOSSj
þ c4STDRETjþ c5TRANSACCTj
þ c6SECURITIESj þ c7EFFICIENCYj
þ c8COMMLOANjþ c9NONPERFORMj
þ c10CHGOFFjþ c11MTGLOANj
þ c12CAPRATIOjþ c13INTANGj
þ c14SENSITIVEþ c15SAVINGSjþ ej ð1Þ
In Eq. (1), LOGFEE is the natural logarithm of the audit fee, LOGASS is
the natural logarithm of total assets, and BIG5 is an indicator variable
defining firms using Big 5 auditors. Based on previous research we expect
the coefficients for LOGASS and BIG5 to be positive. LOSS and STDRET
are proxies for firm risk that often are used in the fee literature. LOSS is
an indicator variable defining banks having net losses during the 2000 fiscal
year and STDRET is the corresponding one-year standard deviation of daily
stock returns. Although a positive coefficient for both variables might rea-
sonably be expected, results from previous studies are mixed (and often
insignificant).
Our test variables, which are defined both in Section 3 and in Table 1, are
represented by coefficients c5 through c15. As discussed previously, higher
values for TRANSACCT would be indicative of increasing organizational
6 Stein et al. (1994) do note that, unlike industrial firms, bank audit fees are not significantly
related to financial leverage. However, they do not investigate alternative, industry-specific
financial proxies for risk or liquidity.
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cost, complexity, and liquidity risk; therefore, c5 should be positive. With
respect to our other measure of liquidity risk, securities are liquid assets that
are also comparatively easy to value. As a result, audit risk and effort should be
decreasing in SECURITIES. So that the directional predictions for this mea-
sure align with those of the other risk measures, SECURITIES is operation-
alized in the regression model as [1 minus (securities/total assets)]. A positive
coefficient for c6 would therefore indicate that audit fees are higher for banks
with lower relative levels of securities to total assets.
Greater operating efficiency implies lower operating risk and may also
provide a signal as to the effectiveness of bank management. We expect firms
that are more efficient (lower value for EFFICIENCY) to have lower audit
fees. The next four variables––COMMLOAN, NONPERFORM, CHGOFF,
and MTGLOAN––proxy for bank credit risk. Our earlier development sug-
gests that audit fees should be increasing in these measures of risk. CAPRA-
TIO and INTANG are our main proxies for capital risk. To the extent that
higher values of CAPRATIO are indicative of increased regulatory pressure,
we expect c12 to be positive. Similarly, because more complex, risk-taking
banks are likely to have higher relative levels of intangible assets and because
goodwill decreases banks regulatory capital, banks with acquisition activity
require greater audit effort and have higher capital risks. Therefore, the coef-
ficient estimate for INTANG should be positive.
The final two variables in Eq. (1) are SENSITIVE and SAVINGS. Because
interest rates generally were rising during 2000 (benefiting asset-sensitive
banks), we expect a negative relationship between SENSITIVE and audit fees.
We realize, however, that gap measures typically are noisy representations of
interest rate risk; as a result, we expect the relationship between LOGFEE and
SENSITIVE to be weaker than the relationship between fees and the other
measures of risk and complexity. SAVINGS is an indicator variable that takes
a value of 1 if the firm is a thrift or savings institution and 0 otherwise. While
commercial banks and thrifts have grown much more alike in recent years and
perform similar deposit-taking and lending functions, thrifts tend to be more
focused on residential real estate lending. The substantial hedging associated
with the securitization of residential mortgage loans creates significant valua-
tion issues both internally for managers and externally for auditors. We
anticipate that these complexities should increase audit costs. Furthermore,
thrifts are both smaller and less widespread than commercial banks and, his-
torically, have been subject to greater litigation risks. 7 For all of these reasons
we expect a positive coefficient for SAVINGS.
7 The FDIC reported that there were 8315 commercial banks and only 1590 thrifts (Historical
Statistics on Banking) as of the end of 2000.
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5.2. Initial results
We report the results from estimating Equation (1) in Table 2. In almost
every case the coefficient estimates are both statistically significant and of the
Table 2
Audit fee model for 277 banks at fiscal year-end 2000
Variable Expected sign Coefficient estimate t-Statistics
INTERCEPT + 2.4761 5.97
LOGASS + 0.5265 30.00
BIG5 + 0.2229 4.51
LOSS + 0.0139 0.10
STDRET + 0.4349 0.18
TRANSACCT + 0.0045 2.02
SECURITIES + 0.6978 3.06
EFFICIENCY + 0.0066 3.57
COMMLOAN + 0.0071 3.87
NONPERFORM + 0.0800 2.34
CHGOFF + 0.0018 1.69
MTGLOAN + 0.0036 2.01
CAPRATIO + 0.0088 1.79
INTANG + 0.0791 3.94
SENSITIVE ) )0.0007 )0.49
SAVINGS + 0.1575 2.52
Adjusted R-square 0.877
LOGFEEj¼ c0+ c1LOGASSj+ c2BIG5j+ c3LOSSj+ c4STDRETj+ c5TRANSACCTj+ c6SECU-
RITIESj + c7EFFICIENCYj + c8COMMLOANj+ c9NONPERFORMj+ c10CHGOFFj + c11M-
TGLOANj+ c12CAPRATIOj+ c13INTANGj+ c14SENSITIVEj+ c15SAVINGSj+ ej.
Because directional predictions are made, p-values are one-tailed; ,  denote p < 0:01, <0.05,
respectively.
LOGFEE¼ logarithm of audit fee.
LOGASS¼ logarithm of total assets.
BIG5¼ 1 if auditor is a Big 5 accounting firm, ¼ 0 otherwise.
LOSS¼ 1 if bank had a net loss for the year, ¼ 0 otherwise.
STDRET¼ standard deviation of daily returns for 250 trading days preceding fiscal year-end.
TRANSACCT¼ total transaction accounts/total deposits.
SECURITIES¼ [1) (total securities/total assets)].
EFFICIENCY¼ efficiency ratio (total operating expenses/total revenue).
COMMLOAN¼ total commercial and agricultural loans/gross loans.
NONPERFORM¼nonperforming loans/gross loans.
CHGOFF¼net charge-offs/loan loss reserve.
MTGLOAN¼ total domestic real estate and home equity loans/gross loans.
CAPRATIO¼ total risk-adjusted capital ratio.
INTANG¼ intangible assets/total assets.
SENSITIVE¼ rate-sensitive assets minus rate-sensitive liabilities.
SAVINGS¼ 1 if organization is a savings institution, ¼ 0 otherwise.
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expected sign. 8 Consistent with studies involving industrial companies, fees are
higher for large firms and are higher if the auditor is a Big 5 firm. We also find
that both of our industry-specific measures of liquidity risk are statistically
significant. TRANSACCT is positively related to audit fees, indicating that
firms with a greater proportion of transaction accounts require more attention
from auditors. The positive relationship between audit fees and SECURITIES
(again, where SECURITIES is defined as 1 minus securities/assets) is consistent
with banks charging more to audit banks that have less liquid, less transparent
asset portfolios.
Our proxy for operating risk, EFFICIENCY, is positive and statistically
significant, as are our proxies for loan complexity and credit risk. Audit fees
are increasing in both commercial loans (COMMLOAN) and residential
mortgage loans (MTGLOAN). Both of these findings are consistent with the
contention of Khurana and Kim (2003) that loans involve a relatively large
amount of subjectivity (and hence more audit attention) with respect to
determining fair value. The coefficient estimates for NONPERFORM and
CHGOFF are positive and significant as well, indicating that auditors demand
more from banks that have lower quality loan portfolios. Given that loan-
related issues were cited as a primary factor in the two major rulings mentioned
earlier in the paper, the importance of these variables in our fee model may be
indicative of audit firms concerns regarding potential litigation.
The final four variables in Eq. (1) are CAPRATIO, INTANG, SENSITIVE
and SAVINGS. The coefficient estimate for SENSITIVE is not statistically
significant; therefore, auditors do not appear to price bank market risks. An
alternative explanation, as mentioned previously, is that interest rate sensitivity
disclosures simply do not adequately capture banks market risks. Table 2 does
reveal a positive, significant relation between the risk-adjust capital ratio
(CAPRATIO) and audit fees. This finding indicates that auditors charge more
to audit banks that are required by regulators to maintain higher levels of
regulatory capital. The significant positive coefficient estimate for INTANG
suggests that a premium is charged for audits of banks that have a history of
acquisition activity. Finally, the coefficient estimate for SAVINGS reveals a
significant premium for audits of savings institutions. 9 We contend that dis-
economies of scale, hedging, and litigation issues are likely to be responsible for
this premium.
8 With respect to regression diagnostics, there is no evidence of problematic multicollinearity or
heteroskedasticity. The largest variance inflation factor is 2.83 and the p-value for the presence of
heteroskedasticity is 0.75. When we use t-statistics adjusted in the manner of White (1980), our
results are not qualitatively different than those presented in Table 2. Furthermore, there is no
evidence of non-normality in the residuals.
9 There are 38 savings and loan institutions in our sample (14% of total observations). Our
results do not change when we eliminate these observations from the model.
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In summary, our findings suggest that of the factors included in monitoring
systems developed by federal regulatory agencies––namely liquidity risk,
operating risk, credit risk, capital risk, and market risk––all except market risk
are reflected in fees charged by bank auditors. The explanatory power of our
model is also higher (adjusted r-square¼ 88%) than that which typically is
reported in the fee literature, suggesting that the presence of significant regu-
latory pressures may strengthen the association between fees and client-specific
risks. Finally, the economic magnitude of the audit pricing effects stemming
from these risk factors is non-trivial. For example, the regression model pre-
sented in Table 1 would predict an audit fee of $125,584 for a bank that (a) is
not a savings institution, (b) has a Big 5 auditor, (c) has positive earnings, and
(d) reports the median value of all other independent variables. Holding all
other factors constant, a mere 10% increase in the nine significant bank risk
factors would increase the predicted audit fee by over 18%, to roughly
$148,600. If the bank were a savings institution as well, the predicted fee would
rise to almost $174,000. These increases from the baseline audit fee for the
‘‘median bank’’ illustrate the economic significance of bank risks in audit
pricing.
5.3. Large versus small banks
Large banks typically have much more complex financial profiles and more
sources of liquidity than small banks as well as considerably different risk
profiles. For example, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) show that large bank
holding companies are allowed to operate with lower capital ratios and typi-
cally engage in more risky activities. These and other factors suggest that the
pricing of bank audits may differ, based on the size of the institution. In Table 3
we presents results from estimating the basic model separately for ‘‘large’’ and
‘‘small’’ banks. Our size distinction is determined by whether the bank has total
assets above or below the median level (approximately $1.2 billion) for the
entire sample. 10
Table 3 shows that a few items––size, audit quality, operating efficiency, and
commercial loans––are priced comparably for both large and small banks.
However, several important differences obtain as well. For example, mortgage
loans and intangible assets positively impact fees at large banks but not at
small banks. We conjecture that these relationships may simply reflect the
10 As in our full sample model, there is no evidence of problematic multicollinearity,
heteroskedasticlty, or non-normality in either the small bank subsample or the large bank
subsample. The largest Variance Inflation Factor for the small (large) bank subsample is 4.71
(2.21). The p-values for tests of heteroskedasticlty and non-normality for small (large) banks are
0.62 (0.52) and 0.64 (0.95), respectively.
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greater amount of audit effort required in evaluating the loan portfolios and
M&A activities of larger, more complex institutions. The finding with respect
to intangibles is also consistent with auditors pricing litigation risks more
aggressively for larger banks, as ‘‘improper accounting’’ for mergers and
Table 3
Audit fee model results for above-median asset versus below-median asset banks
Variable Expected
sign
Above-median Below-median
Asset
banks
t-Statistics Asset
banks
t-Statistics
INTERCEPT + 1.7064 2.77 2.8401 3.04
LOGASS + 0.5697 18.31 0.5238 9.51
BIG5 + 0.3026 3.10 0.2012 3.56
LOSS + )0.0574 )0.28 0.1479 0.59
STDRET + 8.4414 1.68 )2.3729 )0.83
TRANSACCT + 0.0087 2.60 )0.0001 )0.01
SECURITIES + 0.2797 0.78 0.6556 2.12
EFFICIENCY + 0.0061 2.44 0.0081 2.44
COMMLOAN + 0.0081 3.10 0.0052 1.85
NONPERFORM + 0.1145 1.60# 0.0561 1.43#
CHGOFF + )0.0003 )0.17 0.0033 2.01
MTGLOAN + 0.0055 2.33 0.0009 0.32
CAPRATIO + 0.0062 0.73 0.0095 1.50#
INTANG + 0.1027 3.54 0.0504 1.65
SENSITIVE ? )0.0024 )0.96 )0.0006 )0.36
SAVINGS + 0.1464 1.45# 0.1414 2.09
Adjusted R-square 0.857 0.536
LOGFEEj¼ c0 + c1LOGASSj + c2BIG5j + c3LOSSj + c4STDRETj + c5TRANSACCTj + c6SEC-
URITIESj + c7EFFICIENCYj+ c8COMMLOANj+ c9NONPERFORMj+ c10CHGOFFj+ c11-
MTGLOANj+ c12CAPRATIOj+ c13INTANGj+ c14SENSITIVEj+ c15SAVINGSj+ ej.
Because directional predictions are made, p-values are one-tailed; , , # denote p < 0:01, <0.05,
<0.10, respectively.
LOGFEE¼ logarithm of audit fee.
LOGASS¼ logarithm of total assets.
BIG5¼ 1 if auditor is a Big 5 accounting firm, ¼ 0 otherwise.
LOSS¼ 1 if bank had a net loss for the year, ¼ 0 otherwise.
STDRET¼ standard deviation of daily returns for 250 trading days preceding fiscal year-end.
TRANSACCT¼ total transaction accounts/total deposits.
SECURITIES¼ [1) (total securities/total assets)].
EFFICIENCY¼ efficiency ratio (total operating expenses/total revenue).
COMMLOAN¼ total commercial and agricultural loans/gross loans.
NONPERFORM¼nonperforming loans/gross loans.
CHGOFF¼net charge-offs/loan loss reserve.
MTGLOAN¼ total domestic real estate and home equity loans/gross loans.
CAPRATIO¼ total risk-adjusted capital ratio.
INTANG¼ intangible assets/total assets.
SENSITIVE¼ rate-sensitive assets minus rate-sensitive liabilities.
SAVINGS¼ 1 if organization is a savings institution, ¼ 0 otherwise.
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acquisitions was one of the primary drivers in the landmark rulings against
Ernst and Young and KPMG Peat Marwick.
CAPRATIO is marginally significant ðp < 0:07Þ in the small bank sub-
sample but is not significant in the large bank subsample. The significance of
CAPRATIO suggests that audit firms charge fee premiums for smaller insti-
tutions that are forced by regulatory agencies to maintain higher levels of risk-
adjusted capital, but that such premiums do not exist among large banks.
Again, this result is consistent with Demsetz and Strahan (1997), who suggest
that regulators allow large banks to operate with lower capital ratios. With
respect to SAVINGS, almost 60% of the savings institutions in the overall
sample are included in the small bank subsample. Therefore, the fact that
SAVINGS is only marginally significant ðp < 0:07Þ in the large bank sub-
sample may simply be a question of statistical power.
Finally, our measures of liquidity risk differ substantially for small versus
large banks. The volume of transactions accounts (TRANSACCT) is signifi-
cantly and positively related to audit fees for the large bank subsample, but not
for the small bank subsample. This finding is intuitively appealing given the
much greater scale and complexity (both geographically and within the orga-
nizational structure) of large banks. With respect to SECURITIES, smaller
banks rely principally on securities to meet their liquidity needs while large
banks have many more options (e.g., through liability management techniques,
such as purchases of federal funds). As a result, the SECURITIES variable
likely is a cleaner proxy for liquidity risk for small banks than for large banks.
Our finding of a significant positive coefficient for SECURITIES in the small
bank sample but not in the large bank sample is consistent with this notion.
5.4. Factor analysis of bank risks
In Section 3 we defined and developed five primary risks that are viewed as
important by bank regulatory agencies. The models presented in Tables 2 and 3
incorporate ten different measures in an attempt to proxy for these risks. Be-
cause there is likely to be some degree of overlap both across the different risk
categories and between the variables we use within these categories, we used
factor analysis in an attempt to identify, empirically, the commonalities that do
exist.
Table 4 (Panel A) presents the standardized scoring coefficients associated
with each of the four factors retained by the analysis. 11 None of our risk
proxies loads on more than one factor, and only one (EFFICIENCY) does not
load on any factor. We label Factor 1 ‘‘loan mix’’ as it loads exclusively on the
relative amounts of home mortgage loans and commercial loans in banks
11 Estimates are based on the varimax orthogonal rotation method.
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portfolios. The second factor loads most heavily on SECURITIES, CAPRA-
TIO and INTANG. The latter two factors are our primary measures of cap-
ital risk; further, investment securities are one of the major determinants of
the risk-adjusted capital ratio. As a result, we label the second factor ‘‘capi-
tal risk.’’ Factor three is labeled ‘‘loan quality’’ because it loads on NON-
PERFORM and CHARGEOFF. Our final factor loads on SENSITIVE and
TRANSACCT. We label this factor ‘‘interest rate risk’’ because SENSITIVE
provides one definition of a banks maturity gap and because the proportion of
transaction accounts relative to other funding sources has a significant impact
on gap calculations.
Table 4
Factor analysis and revised bank audit fee model
Variable Factor 1
‘‘Loan mix’’
Factor 2
‘‘Capital
risk’’
Factor 3
‘‘Loan
quality’’
Factor 4
‘‘Interest-
rate risk’’
Panel A: Standardized scoring coefficients for bank risk variables
TRANSACCT 0.116 )0.106 0.072 0.648
SECURITIES 0.048 0.512 )0.128 0.158
EFFICIENCY 0.142 0.190 0.228 0.120
COMMLOAN )0.457 )0.089 )0.004 0.016
NONPERFORM )0.036 )0.154 0.606 )0.010
CHGOFF )0.022 )0.009 0.498 0.010
MTGLOAN 0.489 )0.007 )0.041 0.052
CAPRATIO 0.238 )0.433 0.041 0.273
INTANG 0.070 0.372 )0.008 )0.050
SENSITIVE )0.061 0.068 )0.041 0.491
Panel B: Regression model with factors included
LOGFEEj¼ c0+ c1LOGASSj + c2BIG5j + c3LOSSj+ c4STDRETj+ c5SAVINGSj + c6LOAN-
MIXj+ c7CAPITALRISKj+ c8LOANQUALj+ c9RATERISKj+ ej
Coefficient estimate t-Statistics
INTERCEPT 4.4583 18.95
LOGASS 0.5103 32.41
BIG5 0.2077 4.03
LOSS 0.1090 0.80
STDRET 0.2576 0.10
SAVINGS 0.1627 2.48
LOANMIX (Factor 1) )0.0051 )0.23
CAPITALRISK (Factor 2) 0.1064 4.70
LOANQUAL (Factor 3) 0.1123 4.75
RATERISK (Factor 4) 0.0736 3.43
Adjusted R-square 0.863
Denotes p < 0:01.
Variables are as defined in Tables 2 and 3. Bold print is used in Panel A to highlight coefficients that
are significant (in excess of 0.30).
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In Table 4 (Panel B) we replace our ten risk proxies with the four factors
described above. The loanmix factor does not appear to be important in an audit
pricing framework. However, audit fees are significantly related to capital risk,
loan quality and interest rate risk. The fit of this model is comparable (0.863) to
that of the model presented in Table 2 (0.877), and the significance levels of the
remaining variables––LOGASS, BIG5, STDRET, LOSS and SAVINGS––are
directly comparable as well. Overall, our factor analysis allows for the devel-
opment of a more parsimonious model of the manner in which accounting firms
price bank audits. It is also worth noting, however, that a number of distinct
factors are priced (not just a single generic ‘‘risk’’ factor), and that the underlying
components are consistent with the focus of regulatory agencies.
5.5. Auditor industry specialisation
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) analysis of IPO accounting fees shows that,
due to economies of scale, fees in general are decreasing in audit market share.
However, in industries where a ‘‘differentiated’’ auditor exists, that auditor is
able to recapture the economy of scale-based discount and earn a relative
premium for its services. 12 To test for these effects in the banking industry, we
calculated the percentage of total sample bank assets audited by each
accounting firm to supplement the percentage of sample banks audited. 13 We
then included these two market share measures, alternatively, in our regression
model, as well as an indicator variable defining the differentiated audit firm in
the banking industry. If the findings of Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) hold for
financial institutions, the coefficient for the market share measure should be
negative and the coefficient defining the differentiated audit firm should be
positive.
The estimation of this revised model requires identification of the banking
industrys ‘‘differentiated’’ audit firm. Table 1 (Panel A) shows that KPMG
audited 25% of the banks in our sample and had a clear market share lead
based on that metric. However, KPMG audited only 16.1% of the total sample
assets, while PWC and Ernst and Young had asset-based market shares of
34.4% and 25.4%, respectively. As a result, it is not immediately clear which
audit firm, if any, is truly ‘‘differentiated’’ in the banking industry. We there-
fore estimated the model twice with KPMG and PWC defined, alternatively,
12 To be classified as the differentiated auditor in an industry, Mayhew and Wilkins (2003)
require the audit firm to have the largest market share in the industry and to have a market share
lead of at least ten percentage points over its closest audit competitor.
13 Although these values are only rough estimates of audit market share in the banking industry,
they are superior to the measures that could be calculated from Compustat, as the ‘‘auditor’’ field in
Compustat is missing for a vast majority of financial institutions. We also used proportion of total
audit fees (for banks in our sample) as a measure of market share with no difference in results.
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as the differentiated audit firm. These two models are shown in the first two
columns of Table 5.
When we define the differentiated audit firm in terms of the number of banks
audited, the audit market share measure (NUMPCT) is negative and mar-
ginally significant ðp < 0:10Þ. The audit market share measure is negative and
more significant ðp < 0:06Þ when we define the differentiated auditor in terms
of the proportion of total assets audited (ASSETPCT). These results generally
support Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) analysis of IPO fees for industrial firms,
in that audit economies of scale seem to give rise to a negative relationship
Table 5
Industry specialization, non-audit services and bank audit fees
Variable Expected
sign
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeffi-
cient
t-Statis-
tics
Coeffi-
cient
t-Statis-
tics
Coeffi-
cient
t-Statis-
tics
INTERCEPT + 2.2206 5.08 2.4425 5.84 2.2710 5.28
LOGASS + 0.5397 28.88 0.5295 29.56 0.5410 27.93
BIG5 + 0.3635 3.09 0.3105 3.99 0.2199 4.46
LOSS + )0.0247 )0.16 )0.0046 )0.03 0.0070 0.05
STDRET + 1.7920 0.70 0.2044 0.08 0.9990 0.41
TRANSACCT + 0.0040 1.90 0.0042 1.91 0.0045 2.03
SECURITIES + 0.6588 2.76 0.7006 3.06 0.7078 3.11
EFFICIENCY + 0.0071 3.68 0.0067 3.62 0.0067 3.66
COMMLOAN + 0.0077 4.01 0.0070 3.78 0.0071 3.86
NONPER-
FORM
+ 0.0668 1.87 0.0818 2.37 0.0806 2.37
CHGOFF + 0.0021 1.84 0.0018 1.65 0.0017 1.56#
MTGLOAN + 0.0041 2.19 0.0037 2.10 0.0036 2.02
CAPRATIO + 0.0103 2.01 0.0085 1.74 0.0091 1.88
INTANG + 0.0829 3.95 0.0830 4.09 0.0775 3.87
SENSITIVE ) )0.0003 )0.23 )0.0006 )0.42 )0.0007 )0.50
SAVINGS + 0.1576 2.40 0.1486 2.37 0.1554 2.50
NUMPCT ) )1.4086 1.30# – – – –
ASSETPCT ) – – )0.4499 1.56# – –
SPECIALIST + 0.1719 1.15 )0.0194 )0.37 – –
NONAUDIT ) – – – – )0.0248 1.74
Adjusted
R-square
0.876 0.877 0.878
Because directional predictions are made, p-values are one-tailed; , , # denote p < 0:01, <0.05 and
<0.10, respectively.
NUMPCT¼proportion of sample banks audited by audit firm.
ASSETPCT¼proportion of sample bank assets audited by audit firm.
SPECIALIST¼ 1 if audit firm is industry leader based on NUMPCT (Model 1) or ASSETPCT
(Model 2), ¼ 0 otherwise.
NONAUDIT¼ non-audit fees/audit fees.
All other variables are as defined in Tables 2 and 3.
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between audit fees and audit firm market share. However, unlike Mayhew and
Wilkins (2003), the insignificance of SPECIALIST in both models suggests that
differentiated bank auditors are not able to recapture their economy of scale-
based discount. We contend that the fact that KPMG dominates the industry
in terms of number of clients while PWC is the leader in total assets audited
prevents either firm from earning economic rents on the audit services they
provide. This explanation is generally consistent with Pearson and Trompeters
(1994) analysis of audits in the insurance industry.
5.6. Non-audit fees
Another possible explanation for the inability of KPMG or PWC to earn an
audit fee premium is that differentiated auditors may price their audits rela-
tively more competitively in order to gain access to more lucrative services. To
test this possibility, we calculated the ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees for
each sample bank and compared the median values across audit firms. For
Arthur Andersen, Deloitte and Touche, and Ernst and Young, the median
values of this ratio were 0.471, 0.365, and 0.564, respectively. For KPMG and
PWC, the numbers were significantly higher––1.072 and 1.834. Taken in
combination with the findings presented in Section 5.5, these results are con-
sistent with the two industry-leading audit firms focusing on clients with
greater demands for non-audit services, and pricing their audit services very
competitively in order to capture the higher margins associated with non-audit
work.
As a final test of the importance of the provision of non-audit services in
the banking industry, we added the ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees to
equation (1) and re-estimated the model. These findings are presented in the
last column of Table 5. Although our univariate analysis suggests that
industry-leading audit firms––by virtue of the fact that they have the highest
levels of non-audit fee income––are likely to price their audits competitively,
we expect that all banks will discount their audit fees for clients with large
non-audit service demands. Consistent with this expectation, we find that
the coefficient for the non-audit fee ratio is negative and significant
ðp < 0:04Þ. Furthermore, the measure remains significant when KPMG and
PWC clients are removed from the model. 14 These findings suggest that,
across auditors, significant audit fee discounts do exist when non-audit
service revenues are high. The two leading audit firms, however, seem to
have been the most successful at maintaining a client base that maximizes
non-audit fee revenue.
14 The coefficient for NONAUDIT also remains significant when SPECIALIST and either
NUMPCT or ASSETPCT is included in the model.
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6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we use extensive industry-specific disclosures to determine
which client characteristics are the primary drivers of bank audit fees. This
setting is relevant both because it allows us to extend the general audit fee
model into a very rich institutional context and because it allows us to inves-
tigate the extent to which bank audits are priced in accordance with federal
regulatory monitoring systems. Our findings indicate that audit fees are higher
for banks having more transaction accounts, fewer securities as a percentage of
total assets, higher efficiency ratios (i.e., less efficient banks), and higher degrees
of credit risk. Higher fees also obtain for institutions that have higher risk-
adjusted capital ratios and more intangible assets, as well as for savings
institutions. Although effort and billable hours are unobservable in our con-
text, our findings with respect to fees are consistent with audit firms allocating
resources to areas documented as important by regulatory agencies.
We also find that no single audit firm truly dominates the banking industry.
As a result, the top bank auditors are unable to earn a fee premium for their
presumably specialized services. An alternative viewpoint is that industry-
leading audit firms may forego an ‘‘audit specialization premium’’ in order to
gain access to clients with greater (and higher margin) non-audit service de-
mands. Our finding that the two leading audit firms have clients with the
highest ratios of non-audit fees to audit fees supports this notion.
While our results provide significant insights into the variables that deter-
mine audit fees at the individual bank and industry level, they also have
important policy implications. First, accounting firms that are not devoting
sufficient resources to audits of issues viewed as important by regulators may
wish to re-evaluate their procedures. A close tie with the internal audit function
and with the preferences of bank examiners would seem to mitigate the
extensive litigation risks that exist in the banking industry. Additionally, reg-
ulators rely heavily on external auditors as they make their evaluations of
banks financial condition. Given the cost savings and general efficiencies that
should exist if auditors align their processes with those of internal auditors and
bank examiners, bank managers may wish to suggest that their audit com-
mittees encourage such an alignment. A better mapping between these two
functions would also seem to benefit both bank shareholders and the public at
large, to the extent that it reduces the likelihood of loss stemming from regu-
latory action.
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